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Neuronal Testimonial:
Brain-Computer Interfaces and the
Law
Scientific researchershave developed a method of using brainscanning technology to determine if patients in a coma-like condition,
known as a "vegetative state," are conscious despite their inability to
communicate verbally or via motor actions. While in a brain scanner,
patients "answer"yes-or-no questions by envisioning specific scenarios
that activate different parts of the brain. A researcherinterpretsa brain
scan image as a yes-or-no response based on which areas of the brain
demonstrated activation. Exciting as this technology may be, there are
difficulties in terms of the ability to use it within the legal system. This
Note considers those difficulties as they pertain to three contexts: (1)
allowing conscious vegetative-state patients to "testify," (2) providing
police with an investigative tool for "questioning"conscious vegetativestate patients, and (3) assessing conscious vegetative-state patients'
healthcare wishes. It concludes that use of this technology as a way to
allow patients to testify in court is unlikely under the current legal
framework. However, there is a better chance of employing this
technology for police investigations and healthcare decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION

Advancements in science and technology have provided society
with the ability to communicate with conscious patients who are
outwardly in a vegetative state. Specifically, brain-scanning technology
allows patients who are unable to communicate verbally or via motor
actions to answer questions. After interpreting the brain scans,
researchers can tell family members, medical professionals, and legal
actors how the patient answered the questions. Of course, the
technology has limitations, and for now patients are only able to answer
binary (e.g., yes-or-no style) questions with the technique; but this
advancement in communication gives patients who were previously
condemned to silence a new voice-both in their own lives and within
the confines of the legal system.
As the technology develops, new questions will arise about its
use within the legal system. Might individuals in a vegetative state be
able to testify in court using this brain-scanning technology? Could they
aid police investigations? Is it possible for them to share their
healthcare wishes with a judge? Many existing frameworks-including
evidentiary rules, constitutional rights, and current medical practicesmay eventually govern how to use this kind of evidence in criminal
trials, investigations, and civil lawsuits. This Note explores three
scenarios involving brain-scanning technology, analyzing the obstacles
it may face if: (1) presented as evidence in a trial, (2) used as the basis
of probable cause in a police investigation, and (3) employed as a vehicle
for understanding a patient's current wishes regarding her own medical
care.
Part I describes the vegetative state and how functional
magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI") technology is used to
communicate with conscious vegetative-state ("CVS") patients. It also
addresses the current limitations of this technology. Parts II, III, and
IV each begin with a hypothetical scenario that lays out a possible use
of this technology within a specific facet of the legal system. Part II
examines whether brain-computer interface communication could ever
be presented as testimony or evidence in court, specifically within the
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criminal context. Part III analyzes whether this kind of communication
could be used as the basis for probable cause for an arrest warrant or a
search warrant. Part IV considers how this communication may be used
in end-of-life care, refusal of life-sustaining treatment, and other
medical decisions. Finally, this Note concludes with a brief look into the
future of brain-computer interface communication as it relates to these
areas of legal practice.
I. BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACE COMMUNICATION
The vegetative state-how it should be defined and what it
means for patients-is not well understood in today's medical
community.' While a layperson may equate the vegetative state with a
coma, the medical definitions of the two terms differ. The vegetative
state often results from cardiac or respiratory arrest, which causes a
lack of blood flow (and, thus, a lack of oxygen) to the brain. 2 Generally
though, the brain stem will remain relatively intact, since it is resistant
for a short period of time to a lack of blood flow or oxygen.3 Therefore,
CVS patients are not truly "brain dead" and can retain conscious
awareness if they receive medical treatment before destruction of the
brain stem.4

Despite retaining conscious awareness, patients in this state
show no physical signs of consciousness; they are unable to
communicate either verbally or via motor actions, though at times they
appear to be awake and aware.5 For instance, CVS patients may
demonstrate cycles of sleep and wakefulness; ability to breathe on their
own; maintenance of blood pressure; responses to light; sporadic
movements of (nonparalyzed) facial muscles and limbs; gag and cough
reflexes; and eyesight and auditory capabilities.6 Even with the
retention of these behaviors, many of these patients remain unable to
make purposeful motor movements in response to stimuli due to a loss
of certain brain functions.7 However, vegetative-state patients do

1.
Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE 1402,
1402 (2006).
Robyn S. Shapiro, The Case of L.W.: An Argument for a Permanent Vegetative State
2.
Treatment Statute, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 441 (1990).
3.
See id.
4.
See id.
5.
See Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402.
6.
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 441.
Maxine H. Harrington, Advances in Neuroimagingand the Vegetative State: Implications
7.
for End-of-Life Care, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 213, 215 (2013).
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exhibit reflexive or automatic movements in response to pain or loud
noises.8
The vegetative state is not a terminal condition, and as long as
patients receive proper healthcare, they can live for an extended period
of time. 9 Indeed, depending on factors such as age, pre-injury state of
health, and quality of healthcare, patients may survive for decades.10
And today, there are an estimated ten thousand to twenty-five
thousand adult vegetative-state patients in the United States, with
annual medical costs of up to seven billion dollars." Moreover,
improvement in condition over time may be unlikely, and the medical
community generally considers a vegetative state to be permanent if
the patient remains in the condition for at least twelve months
postinjury. 12 Since CVS patients may be living for decades in a state
that does not permit them physical communication with the outside
world, facilitating their ability to participate in society is of the utmost
importance.
Until now, CVS patients were unable to engage firsthand in the
legal system, in part because most medical professionals assumed no
vegetative-state patients were conscious. Moreover, even if any were,
there was no way to communicate with them. Now though, researchers
are beginning to use neuroscience technology to communicate with CVS
patients. 13 For instance, researchers can use fMRI to interpret the
neural activity of CVS patients by measuring blood oxygenation
throughout the brain to identify changes in neural activity.14 Changes
in the brain's blood flow track changes in brain activity, and areas of
the brain that are working harder (i.e., using more energy), and thus
needing more oxygen, receive more of the blood supply.1 5 Detecting
these changes in blood flow allows researchers to assess which regions
of the brain a person is using during particular tasks. 16 The subsequent
Section delves further into understanding fMRI technology.
Id.
8.
9.
Id.
10. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 441-43 ("It is not uncommon for a patient in a permanent
vegetative state to survive for five to twenty years.").
11. Dalia B. Taylor, Note, Communicating with Vegetative State Patients: The Role of
Neuroimagingin American Disability Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1451, 1454 (2014).
12. Nancy L. Childs & Walt N. Mercer, Late Improvement in Consciousness After PostTraumatic Vegetative State, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 24, 24 (1996).
13. See Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402.
14. David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, HOUS. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 36, 38;
Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402.
15. Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience
Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 941-42 (2013).
16. Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truth, Proofs, Lies, and
Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REV. 861, 865 (2011); see also Cassin, supra note 15, at 942:
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A. The Science of fMRI
fMRI and similar brain-scanning technologies are likely to
become more commonplace in the legal system as these techniques
continue to develop. 17 Thus, it is important for legal actors to
understand the science and mechanisms behind the technology-the
following study depicts why. A decade ago, researchers put a patient
who had sustained a severe traumatic brain injury ("TBI") during a car
accident in an fMRI scanner to better understand her brain function. 18
The patient fulfilled all of the international guidelines criteria for a
diagnosis of "vegetative state" and she remained unresponsive for
several months following her accident. 19 To test the patient's level of
consciousness, researchers measured her neural responses during the
presentation of spoken sentences, as compared to random noises that
acoustically matched the sentences but did not constitute sentences
themselves. 20 The point of the noise sequences was to assess whether
the patient was actually comprehending speech or whether she was
merely reacting to sound.2 1 Her resulting brain images were equivalent
to those observed in healthy (i.e., fully conscious and nonvegetative)
volunteers listening to the same sentences and noise sequences. 22
Additionally, for sentences incorporating ambiguous words (e.g., creak
vs. creek, ceiling vs. sealing), the patient's brain scans showed a
response similar to that observed in the brains of healthy participants,
further indicating that the patient was truly engaging in language
comprehension. 2 3

&

Neuroscientists refer to this as the BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent) signal. An
fMiRI scan will result in a colorful depiction of BOLD response over time, allowing a
visible, objective measurement of brain activity. The BOLD signal is widely accepted to
be a reliable determination of fluctuating activity in the brain.
17. Andrew Peterson et al., Assessing Decision-Making Capacity in the Behaviorally
Nonresponsive Patientwith Residual Covert Awareness, AJOB NEUROSCIENCE, Oct.-Dec. 2013, at
3, 10 (noting the advancements in brain-imaging technology due to "reduced costs of imaging
equipment, a larger patient population, and several recent innovations in [brain-computer
interface] neuroimaging").
18. Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402.
19. Id.
20. Id. An example of a sentence spoken to the participant is: "There was milk and sugar in
his coffee." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Moreover, in research with healthy volunteers under anesthesia, the participants did
not exhibit neural signs "of high-level speech comprehension, strengthening the conclusion that
activations in response to semantically ambiguous words indicate awareness." Carl E. Fisher
Paul S. Appelbaum, Diagnosing Consciousness:Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State, 38
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 374, 377 (2010) (citation omitted).
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To better assess whether she was consciously aware, researchers
then gave the patient instructions to perform two mental imagery tasks
while in the fMRI scanner-(1) imagine playing a game of tennis and
(2) imagine visiting all of the rooms of her house-as these mental
imagery tasks stimulate distinct parts of the brain. 24 Researchers found
that the patient's brain scans during the mental imagery tasks were
indistinguishablefrom those of healthy volunteers following the same
instructions. 25 These results confirmed that the patient had the ability
to understand spoken commands and respond to them through brain
activity, even though she was unable to respond through speech or
movement. 26 Furthermore, the act of performing the tasks in itself
demonstrated the patient's consciousness, as it was a "clear act of
intention." 27
In another study, researchers asked twenty-three vegetativestate patients to perform the same mental imagery tasks as in the study
described above while undergoing an fMRI scan. 28 The scans showed
that at least four of these patients were able to follow researchers'
directions by imagining the described tasks. 29 These results
demonstrate that at least a portion of patients in a vegetative state have
brain activity that reflects some awareness and cognition. 30 In fact, a

24. Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402. Those skeptical of this research postulate that the
words "tennis" and "house" may simply trigger automatic brain responses even in unconscious
participants. However, there is "no data supporting the inference that such stimuli can
unconsciously elicit sustained [blood flow] responses in these regions of the brain." Adrian M.
Owen, Using FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging to Detect Covert Awareness in the Vegetative
State, 64 ARCHIVE NEUROLOGY 1098, 1099-1100 (2007) ("[I]magining playing tennis and
imagining moving around the house elicit reliable, robust, and statistically distinguishable
patterns of activation in specific regions of the brain."); Heidi Ledford, Brain Scan Allows
Unconscious Patient to Communicate, NATURE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.nature.com/news/

2010/100203/full/news.2010.53.html [https://perma.cclU5V8-QJLP].
25. Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402; see also Owen, supra note 24, at 1100 (comparing brain
scan images of a patient's neural activation during the tennis imagery and spatial navigation
imagery tasks with those of healthy volunteers).
26. Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402.
27. Id.
28. See Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of
Consciousness, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010).
29. Id. at 585. Researchers could not determine why the other patients did not show evidence
of performing the mental imagery tasks. Of course, it may be that those patients have not retained
conscious awareness, although a failure to perform the mental imagery tasks in this instance does
not conclusively prove a lack of consciousness. For example, it may be that the research method
was not sensitive enough to detect small effects or that the patients are only conscious at some
points in time (but happened not to be during the study). Furthermore, some patients may retain
consciousness but lack the cognitive capabilities (e.g., language comprehension, working memory,
etc.) to carry out the task. It may also be that some patients consciously chose not to engage in the
task, for whatever reason, even if they had the ability to follow instructions. See id. at 588.
30. Id. at 588.
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separate study found that forty-one percent of the vegetative-state
patients that were examined showed some signs of consciousness. 31
There is also research regarding a CVS patient responding to
yes-or-no questions via fMRI technology. 32 Researchers asked the
patient to imagine playing tennis when the answer to a question was
yes, and to imagine walking through a house when the answer to a
question was no. 33 To communicate via a brain scan, researchers cannot
ask people undergoing an fMRI to simply imagine answering "yes" or
"no," as there are no established brain patterns for such thoughts. 34
Importantly, the accuracy of using mental imagery such as playing
tennis and walking through a house to signify "yes" or "no" has been
tested with healthy volunteers, which provides a necessary baseline
with which to compare the brain scans of patients in a vegetative
state. 35 Healthy volunteers were asked yes-or-no questions with
verifiable answers (e.g., "Do you have any brothers?") and instructed to
imagine whichever mental imagery indicated the correct answer. 36
Researchers were able to determine whether the healthy volunteers
intended to answer "yes" or "no" with one-hundredpercent accuracyindicating that evaluating whether someone is answering "yes" or "no"
in an fMRI machine via the mental imagery method is an objective,
rather than subjective, task. 37
In the study with the CVS patient, researchers asked him yesor-no questions involving his personal history, such as "Is your father's
name Alexander?" 38 The patient answered five of six questions
correctly; no brain activity was observed in response to the sixth
question (rather than an observation of brain activity indicating the

31. Caroline Schnakers et al., DiagnosticAccuracy of the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious
State: ClinicalConsensus Versus StandardizedNeurobehavioralAssessment, 9 BMC NEUROLOGY,
no. 35, 2009, at 1, 3.
32. See Ledford, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. Id. ("[1]t is difficult-if not impossible-to determine whether someone is thinking yes or
no. . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35. See Monti et al., supra note 28, at 581.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 583 (In total, forty-eight questions were asked of the healthy volunteers and
researchers were able to determine the correct answer based on the participant's brain scans for
all forty-eight.); see also Owen, supra note 24, at 1101 ("[H]ealthy volunteers were instructed to ...
imagine playing tennis or navigating around their homes without informing the investigators of
their choice. It was possible to determine with 100% accuracy which task was being performed by
each participant [solely based on brain activity]."). To view imagery comparing the yes-or-no brain
scans of CVS patients with those of healthy volunteers, see Stuart Fox, Brain Scan Shows
Vegetative Patient Responding to Yes-or-No Questions, POPULAR Sol. (Feb. 4, 2010),
https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-02/brain-scan-shows-vegetative-patient-respondingyes-or-no-questions [https://perma.cc/V3JT-LB9F].
38. See Monti et al., supra note 28, at 584-85.
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incorrect answer). 39 The fMRI technology is not sophisticated enough to
indicate why the patient did not answer the final question; some
possibilities are that the patient did not hear it, elected not to answer
it, fell asleep, or lost consciousness. 40 Notably, instances where patients
do not appear to answer questions or follow directions via their brain
activity-whether in response to one question or the entire taskcannot be taken as conclusive proof of a lack of consciousness, in part
because false negatives in functional neuroimaging studies have been
found even in healthy volunteers, and in part because CVS patients
may go in and out of consciousness at different times. 4 1
The next step for research will be asking patients in a vegetative
state questions with unverifiable answers. 42 As the technology
continues to develop, especially in the context of questions that lack a
verifiable answer, it will likely be proffered more often in legal
proceedings. Thus, judges must be prepared to assess this technology
for an array of different uses, and legal actors must be prepared to make
the most convincing arguments for (or against) its use. Addressing the
current limitations of this technology is an important first step to
understanding how judges and legal actors will begin their analyses.

&

39. Id. at 585 ("For example, in response to the question 'Is your father's name Alexander?'
the patient responded 'yes' (correctly) .... In response to the question 'Is your father's name
Thomas?' the patient responded 'no' (also correctly) . . . . [F]or [the five answered questions,] the
[brain] pattern produced always matched the factually correct answer.").
40. Id.
41. Owen et al., supra note 1, at 1402. This may suggest that it is imperative to use brainscanning technology to test vegetative-state patients for consciousness multiple times, not just
once, if the first results come back negative. People in a vegetative state may go in and out of
consciousness for a variety of reasons, so we should search for the windows of consciousness that
are available-just because a patient was not experiencing consciousness at the moment of the
test does not indicate that they would never be able to use this method to communicate. See Charles
Weijer et al., Ethical Considerations in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Research in
Acutely Comatose Patients, 139 BRAIN 292, 292 (2016) ("The dynamic nature of brain injury and
the potential for confounding factors, such as medication and metabolic disturbance, must be taken
into account during patient assessment. Indeed, these features highlight the importance of
repeated examination and integration of findings from diverse diagnostic modalities.").
Additionally, some patients may be conscious but unable to engage in motor imagery, unable to
hear task instructions due to deafness, and so on-thus, a verbally instructed motor mental
imagery task would not be an adequate measure of consciousness for such patients. See Adam
Hampshire et al., Assessing Residual Reasoning Ability in Overtly Non-communicative Patients
Using fMRI, 2 NEUROIMAGE: CLINICAL 174, 183 (2013); Peter C. Harman, Note, "Locked-In" to
Their Decisions: Investigating How the States Govern Revocation of Advance Directives and How
Three States Make Revocation Impossible for People with Locked-In Syndrome, 3 HASTINGS SCI.
TECH. L.J. 193, 198 n.37 (2011). Furthermore, it is possible that some patients may have
diminished capacity only in certain areas of the brain-thus, if a patient has diminished capacity
in one or more areas of the brain required for a specific mental imagery task, that patient would
not be able to successfully complete that particular task. See Taylor, supra note 11, at 1458.
42. See Ledford, supranote 24.
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B. The Limitations of fMRI and PotentialAlternatives
The critiques of fMRI technology are pertinent to the legal
system, as parties opposed to admitting such evidence will bring up the
technology's shortcomings in court, and parties interested in admitting
such evidence must know how to defend against those shortcomings.
Notably, the use of this technology may at times be prohibitively
expensive, affecting which parties can rely on it and thus creating
equity concerns in cases where the parties have disparate resources.
However, cost has become less of a concern as more versatile
technologies are developed and creative solutions are implemented. For
instance, Dr. Kent Kiehl, a professor at the University of New Mexico,
uses a portable fMRI-built inside of a tractor-trailer-to conduct
neuroscience research with prison inmates. 43 Since the inmates cannot
come to Dr. Kiehl, he brings the fMRI to them; perhaps the same thing.
could be done for CVS patients who reside in a medical facility that
lacks an fMRI machine. This option also helps alleviate another
common critique of fMRI, which is that transferring patients to an
fMRI-equipped facility can be physically stressful on the patient.
Another criticism of fMRI is that patient movements while in the
machine can disrupt the accuracy of results (i.e., someone undergoing
an fMRI must keep their head completely still in order for the scanner
to output accurate brain scan results). Additionally, patients with metal
implants (common in many traumatically-injured populations) cannot
undergo fMRI scanning since it operates via an extremely powerful
magnet. 44 Finally, fMRI technology does not provide a direct measure
of neural activity, but rather measures changes in blood flow within the
brain, and those changes are then used to infer a person's actual neural
activity.45

To mitigate some of the criticisms of fMRI, researchers have
turned to electroencephalography ("EEG") as an alternative brainscanning technique in part because it is cheaper and more portable than
fMRI technology. 46 An EEG operates by attaching electrodes to a
person's scalp to measure the electrical currents that brain activity

43. John Seabrook, Suffering Souls: The Search for the Roots of Psychopathy, NEW YORKER
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/10/suffering-souls
2008),
10,
(Nov.
[https://perma.cc/7L3E-Q6AJ].
44. See Damian Cruse et al., Bedside Detection ofAwareness in the Vegetative State:A Cohort
Study, 378 LANCET 2088, 2088 (2011).
45. Taylor, supra note 11, at 1457 ("These changes in blood flow are assumed to be 'tightly
coupled in both space and time' with brain activity." (quoting David A. Leopold, Pre-emptive Blood
Flow, 457 NATURE 387, 387 (2009))).
46. Id. at 1457-58.
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produces. 47 In one EEG study, sixteen patients in a vegetative state
were asked to imagine either wiggling their toes, which causes
increased brain activity in one portion of the brain, or to imagine
making hand movements, which causes increased activity in a different
portion of the brain.4 8 Patients were asked to partake in these mental
imagery tasks whenever they heard a tone (the time in between tones
was interspersed with alternating periods of instructed relaxation).4 9
The researchers used the tone to eliminate any claims that the patients'
brain activity was just a subconscious response to trigger words; by
having participants wait to engage in the mental imagery task until
they heard the tone, researchers knew that any participants who
showed brain activity in the predetermined areas at the time of the tone
were consciously performing the tasks.5 0
Three of the sixteen patients were able to complete the
experiment successfully, meaning these patients could engage in
sustained attention, language comprehension to understand the
prompts, and short-term memory capabilities to remember the
instructions, as well as could determine which task to perform in
response to certain prompts.5 1 Each of these brain functions are
associated with consciousness, suggesting that at least these three
patients experienced some level of conscious awareness during the
experiment. 52 In turn, researchers have recently begun using EEG to
communicate with patients using a yes-or-no system similar to that
used with fMRI.5 3 In the study, patients were connected to an EEG
machine at various times over a number of weeks, during which

47. Adam Teitcher, Weaving FunctionalBrain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evidence: A Case
for FunctionalNeuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 365 (2011).
48. Cruse et al., supra note 44, at 2088-89. Imagining wriggling one's toes causes increased
brain activity in the premotor cortex, while imagining making hand movements causes increased
brain activity in the lateral premotor cortex. Id.
49. Id. at 2089. The specific instructions were:
Every time you hear a beep, try to imagine that you are squeezing your right-hand into
a fist and then relaxing it/wiggling all of the toes on both your feet, and then relaxing
them. Concentrate on the way your muscles would feel if you were really performing
this movement. Try to do this as soon as you hear each beep.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 2092; see also Taylor, supra note 11, at 1461-62.
51. Taylor, supra note 11, at 1456 (quoting Cruse et al., supra note 44, at 2092-93).
52. Id.
53. Jacqueline Howard, Decoding the Thoughts ofPatients Who Can't Even Blink, CNN (Feb.
1, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/healthllocked-in-als-brain-computer-study/
[https://perma.cc[LW9W-GJ35]. Note that the patients in this study were diagnosed with lockedin syndrome, which presents similarly to patients in a vegetative state, but has slightly different
diagnostic criteria. For more information on locked-in syndrome, see Steven Laureys et al., The
Locked-In Syndrome: What Is It Like to Be Conscious but Paralyzed and Voiceless?, 150 PROGRESS
BRAIN RES. 495 (2005).
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researchers repeatedly asked patients verifiable yes-or-no and true-orfalse questions. 54 Overall, the patients responded with correct answers
at a rate of about seventy percent. 5 The researchers then asked
patients questions without verifiable answers such as "are you happy?"
and discovered that patients repeatedly gave a response of "yes" to this
and similar questions-suggesting that the patients had a positive
outlook on life.56

EEG technology may therefore provide an alternative means of
communication with CVS patients when fMRI scanning does not prove
viable. This is important for the legal system for many reasons. First,
it would theoretically be possible to do an EEG in a courtroom in front
of jurors and a judge, whereas the machine required for an fMRI scan
is not suitable for a courtroom due to its size and magnetic properties.
The portability of the technology may change the legal analysis, as
explored more in-depth below. Second, EEG technology is cheaper to
use, therefore parties with a limited budget would have better access to
EEG than fMRI. Third, EEG can be used with a wider variety of
patients, such as those with metal implants, enlarging the number of
people in a vegetative state who could make use of this communication
system.
Of course, EEG has its own limitations. These include difficulty.
reading neural activity in deeper parts of the brain (since the electrodes
for the EEG are placed on the scalp), which may be especially troubling
for CVS patients, as many of the areas critical for consciousness are in.
the subcortical parts of the brain.5 7 Since the bulk of the current
research with CVS patients has been done with fMRI rather than EEG,
this Note primarily discusses the use of fMRIs in legal contexts. Still,
regardless of the technology used, legal actors ought to be aware of the
steady advancements neuroscience is making because as the
technologies and techniques improve, the legal analysis will change.
II. TESTIFYING NEURONS AND POSSIBLE IN-COURT USES
Imagine you are the key government witness in a felony case.
You are prepared to testify at the trial, which is coming up in a few
months. As you are heading back to your apartment from work you

54. Howard, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. John R. Hughes, Limitations of the EEG in Coma and Brain Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 121, 121, 126, 131 (1978). This is not an issue for fMRI scanning since fMRI machines
can detect blood flow changes throughout the brain, even in the deeper subcortical parts. See
Cassin, supranote 15, at 942.
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encounter a shadowy figure in a dark alley. Now you lie in a hospital
bed-unable to speak, move your limbs, or communicate with those
around you in any way-despite the fact that you have retained
consciousness. You ended up here because you were the victim of a
brutal attack, carried out in an attempt to silence your testimony, and
it has now left you in a vegetative state. Is there any way for you to still
provide your testimony to the court? Using this scenario as a guide, this
Part explores the obstacles to admissibility for brain-scanning
technology when used for a CVS witness providing testimony in a
criminal trial.
A. Preliminary Concerns
Initially, it is important to note that while much of criminal law
is governed by state law, federal law (such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence) strongly influences state laws and practices. Thus, this
Section focuses on how federal law, rather than any specific state law,
would apply to the hypothetical scenario above.
Preliminary concerns in admitting brain scans as evidence
involve the quality, reliability, and validity of the technology used to
capture the brain scans. Notably, brain scans conducted in different
machines or by different researchers may not produce the exact same
results, since the technological parameters of the machine can be
adjusted by the researcher.5 8 Similarly, differences in the computer
software of the technology (such as two machines using different
versions of the software) can affect the output of the machine. 59 This is
relevant because the prosecution and defense in the same case might
separately have the witness undergo an fMRI scan with different
machines and different researchers (much like in cases where each side
has the defendant undergo a session with a different psychologist); the
variations in the technology and the people operating it means that
each side of the case might end up with different results. 60 Luckily,
neuroscience researchers are beginning to take evidentiary concerns
into account and are refining the technology and techniques to better
suit the courtroom. 6 1
58. Sally Terry Green, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony Based on Adolescent
Brain Imaging Technology in the Prosecution of Juveniles: How Fairness and Neuroscience
Overcome the Evidentiary Obstacles to Allow for Application of a Modified Common Law Infancy
Defense, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2010).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 21-22. For instance, 'The Biomedical Information Network," an initiative led
by the National Institutes of Health, looked at how to standardize procedures for neuroscience
technology. See Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations
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One important concern in this area that is not addressed indepth by this Note is the competency and consciousness of the patient
in question. In law, competency is not a new concept but it has never
been applied to CVS witnesses. However, because TBI patients have
served as witnesses in criminal trials, how competency is treated in
regards to patients who have suffered a TBI may be illuminating, since
the vegetative-state condition relates to brain injury. 62 Concerns
regarding the testimony of TBI patients include recall accuracy, how
much weight the judge or jury can place on the testimony, and whether
the witness can testify at all (e.g., the witness may lack the necessary
speech abilities due to the TBI). 63 For any witness, not just ones with a
TBI, federal and state evidentiary rules start with a presumption that
the witness is competent to testify, but require witnesses "to possess the
mental ability to perceive, recollect, narrate, and understand what it
means to tell the truth." 64
Of course, to determine if a CVS witness is truly competent and
conscious, it will be important to ensure that the witness is responding
during the brain scans with true intentional responses. Such
information could be gleaned by having the witness undergo brain scans
multiple times on various days to try to ascertain the extent of her
conscious awareness. Multiple scans may be useful in that many
patients may experience consciousness only intermittently, so one scari
may not capture a patient's true communication ability. Additionally,
competency may be assessed by asking the patient a number of
questions with verifiable answers, such as questions about personal
history or basic common knowledge. Doing this could provide a baseline
for determining whether the patient is able to give truthful answers.
Assuming the patient succeeds past this important step, there are a
variety of other obstacles that stand in the way of admitting this kind
of evidence.
B. Hearsay
One considerable obstacle to admitting a CVS witness's fMRI
scans will be that courts will likely consider "statements" of a CVS

in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 281-82
(2007).
62. See Robert I. Simon & Alan A. Abrams, ClinicalLegal Issues, in TEXTBOOK OF TRAUMATIC
BRAIN INJURY 533, 537-38 (Jonathan M. Silver et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
63. See id.
64. Id.
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witness to be hearsay.65 Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."66 Parties
attempting to introduce a CVS witness's testimony via fMRI scans will
face two distinct hearsay challenges.
First, given that fMRI machines must be in a special room due
to the powerful magnetic properties of the machine, a CVS witness's
"testimony" would not be given live and in court, technically making it
an out-of-court statement. 67 Notably, a similar obstacle to the hearsay
rule has been circumvented before through the use of live video
testimony. In Maryland v. Craig, which was a child sexual abuse case,
the Supreme Court permitted the child victim to testify via video
conferencing technology due to concern that the child would suffer
severe emotional distress if in the same room as the defendant. 68 The
Supreme Court went so far as to note that it had "never insisted on an
actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which
testimony is admitted against a defendant." 69 Given this precedential
authority and the potential that in some cases the need for the CVS
witness's testimony will overcome the face-to-face preference, the actual
questioning could be done via video conferencing technology to sidestep
the in-court aspect of the hearsay issue.
Second, the true value of the testimony would likely not come
from the questioning of the CVS patient herself but rather from the
doctor or researcher who interprets the brain scans. This presents
another difficulty in relation to hearsay, as the out-of-court statement
would not be offered by the declarant herself; instead it would be offered
by an interpreter of sorts-the doctor or researcher. Additionally, in
most instances, the interpretations of the brain scans (i.e., whether the
witness was answering "yes" or "no") would be offered for the truth of
the matter asserted; so, the "testimony" would likely be hearsay.
Importantly, if the hearsay falls under an exception in the
Federal Rules of Evidence it may still be admitted. 70 The above scenario

65. But note that hearsay is generally only an issue in jury trials, not bench trials. See
Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[I]n
the Second Circuit, as in other federal courts of appeals, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
generally apply when the judge is acting as a fact-finder because a judge can presumably exclude
improper inferences.").
66. Hearsay, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also FED. R. EVID. 801.
67. As noted above though, advancements in EEG technology may technically make it
possible for a patient to undergo a brain scan in the courtroom, which may affect the legal analysis
of the admissibility of this technology. See supra Section I.B.
68. 497 U.S. 836, 841, 857 (1990).
69. Id. at 847.
70. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
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may fall under Rule 804, which involves hearsay exceptions when the
declarant is unavailable as a witness. This Rule has two parts: 804(a)
describes the criteria the declarant must meet in order to be considered
"unavailable," while 804(b) describes what kinds of testimony may be
admitted, regardless of its status as hearsay, when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness. First, it is possible that Rule 804(a)(4) applies.
That section reads: "A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a
witness if the declarant .

.

. cannot be present or testify at the trial or

hearing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness,
or mental illness[.]"71 It is plausible that the vegetative state could
qualify as an "infirmity" or "physical illness." 7 2

However, for the "testimony" to be admitted, it still has to pass
muster under Rule 804(b) by falling under one of its enumerated
exceptions. Rule 804(b)(6) offers a potentially applicable exception for
our hypothetical scenario, admitting "statement[s] offered against a
party that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully causingthe declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that
result." Case law indicates that causation on the part of the party who
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability can include a spectrum
of actions as broad as threatening the witness about showing up to
testify to murdering the witness to prevent her from testifying. 73
Thus, examining the scenario presented at the beginning of Part
II, it seems highly likely that if a defendant (or his agent) assaulted a
witness violently enough to put her in a vegetative state with the intent
to prevent that witness's availability at trial, Rule 804(b)(6) would
apply. Of course, the scenario only circumvents the rule against hearsay
when the defendant (or his agent) is the one who acted to put the
witness in a vegetative state. If, say, a healthy witness was going to
71. FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(4); see, e.g., People v. Duncan, 835 N.W.2d 399, 407 (Mich. 2013)
(four-year-old's existing mental infirmity rendered her unavailable under FRE 804(a)(4)); State v.
Whisler, 810 P.2d 540, 544 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (ninety-four-year-old's health issues rendered
him unavailable under FRE 804(a)(4)).
72. See United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that government witness was unavailable to testify due to
a "then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hoselton v. Metz Baking Co., 48 F.3d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1995) (trial court did not commit plain
error by allowing admission of deposition testimony of accountant since there was evidence he was
ill and of advanced age); United States v. Keithan, 751 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1984) (district court
properly allowed the use of two government witnesses' videotaped depositions at trial as there was
evidence that one suffered from a condition that prevented him from walking and the other
suffered from a heart condition that confined her to her home).
73. See United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court properly
found that the defendant had intentionally prevented the witness from testifying by directing
others to threaten the witness on his behalf); United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671-72 (2d
Cir. 2007) (finding that the defendant forfeited any right to exclude evidence of a witness's out-ofcourt statements due to his involvement in the murder of the witness).
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testify against the defendant, but then was violently assaulted and
rendered vegetative by a completely separate third party (i.e., one not
acting on the direction of the defendant or his agent), then this
exception would not apply to the CVS witness's "testimony." The same
would be true if the witness had an independent medical episode that
caused the vegetative state. As such, even though it may be possible to
bypass the rule against hearsay via Rule 804(b)(6), this exception will
only apply in a very specific, limited number of instances.
For a hearsay exception that may apply more broadly, we can
look to Rule 807, the "Residual Exception."7 4 Essentially, Rule 807

provides that if the testimony is reliable and legitimately necessary for
the party presenting it, then the court may allow admissibility of the
evidence through the Residual Exception. Whether the scenario
presented above would be admissible under the Residual Exception
would depend on the specific circumstances of the situation, but this
hearsay exception may envelop more variations than Rule 804(b)(6). A
party may have a number of ways to demonstrate a legitimate need for
the evidence under the Residual Exception, especially in situations
where the evidence is critical to the case.
Overall, the hearsay obstacles to admitting a CVS witness's
testimony are likely to be great barriers, since the exceptions-even the
Residual Exception-apply in only a limited number of situations.7 5
However, since this use of neuroscience technology and communication
with CVS patients is new to the court, judicial decisionmakers may find
that the need for an avenue for CVS patient participation in the
courtroom meets the high bar the Residual Exception was intended to
set. 76
C. The Confrontation Clause
The Constitution presents another issue comparable to the
hearsay problem: the Sixth Amendment's "Confrontation Clause,"
which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."7 7
This means that the Confrontation Clause centers around the issue of

74. FED. R. EVID. 807.
75. See United States v. Ingram, 501 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that use of the
Residual Exception is limited to "rare[ ]" and "exceptional circumstances" (quoting United States
v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 893 (8th Cir. 2005))), vacated on other grounds, 555 U.S. 1132 (2009).
76. See Peneaux, 432 F.3d at 893 ("Congress added Rule 803(24), the predecessor to Rule 807,
because it could not foresee every possible evidentiary scenario.").
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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cross-examination (i.e., "confrontation").7 8 It only applies in criminal
cases, not civil proceedings, and only when the witness is brought
against the defendant. So, if the defendant wanted to bring in CVS
witness testimony on his behalf, the Confrontation Clause would not be
a hurdle.
For the hypothetical scenario presented at the start of Part II,
one might envision opposing attorneys cross-examining the CVS
witness in the same way the direct examination was completed-by
asking yes-or-no questions while the patient is in the fMRI machine.
But would this satisfy the Confrontation Clause? Arguably, since the
CVS witness could not be brought into court during trial, the defendant
would not have the opportunity "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." This might be remedied by allowing the defendant and
his attorneys to attend the direct examination of the CVS witness when
it takes place, thus allowing the potential for the defense to make
objections in real time. The judge could also attend both the direct
examination and cross-examination to rule on any objections or make
decisions if a dispute arises between the parties.
Notably though, only "testimonial" statements cause a declarant
to fall within the confines of the Confrontation Clause.7 9 The Supreme
Court has declared that statements are testimonial when made under
circumstances which indicate that the primary purpose of the
conversation (or interrogation/questioning) "is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."80 If the
primary purpose is to assist police in an "ongoing emergency," then
statements made in that conversation are not testimonial. 81 Whether a
CVS witness's statement is "testimonial" would differ on a case-by-case
basis, and the judge would need to evaluate the statement to determine
if any part of it was "testimonial" and thus barred by the Confrontation
Clause.8 2 Overall, it is likely that most of the time a CVS witness's
statement will be testimonial, since questioning a CVS witness for a

78. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-59 (2004) (describing case law holding that
the Confrontation Clause bars a witness's out-of-court testimonial statements unless the witness
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
79. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
80. Id. at 822.
81. Id.
82. A thought-provoking adjustment to the scenario presented in Part II would be if the court
had a CVS witness who only demonstrated responses to direct-examination questions, but none to
cross-examination questions. Since the technology cannot determine why a CVS witness is not
responding (e.g., the reason could fall anywhere on a spectrum between a loss of consciousness to
an unwillingness to respond), is it fair to rely on a witness who may have an easy out for questions
she does not want to answer? Would a judge have enough basis for holding a CVS witness in
contempt of court if she did not show any responses to cross-examination questions?
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trial does not have the primary purpose of assisting police in an ongoing
emergency but rather is relevant to criminal prosecution. However,
even if something is barred by the text of the Confrontation Clause,
there are certain exceptions to the bar against admission.
One such exception is the "forfeiture exception," which applies
when the defendant is responsible for the witness being unavailable, so
long as the defendant has the specific intent of preventing the witness
from participating in the legal proceedings at the time the defendant
rendered her unavailable. 8 3 The forfeiture exception, which is textually
similar to Rule 804(b)(6), states: "A defendant may forfeit confrontation
rights and render hearsay rules inapplicable if the defendant is
responsible for the witness's unavailability." 8 4 This textual similarity
leads to overlap in what actions constitute responsibility for a witness's
unavailability. Since the actions falling under the forfeiture exception
are similar to the actions mentioned in the Rule 804(b)(6) analysis, it
seems likely that if the defendant (or his agent) assaults the witness so
violently as to leave her in a vegetative state, this would qualify as the
defendant being responsible for the unavailability of the witness. If this
is the case, the testimony may bypass the Confrontation Clause via the
forfeiture exception. However, the forfeiture exception applies in only a
limited number of instances, and, as mentioned above, since
questioning a CVS witness for trial will likely only produce testimonial
statements, it may be difficult to circumvent the Confrontation Clause.
D. InterpreterVersus Expert
As discussed briefly above, it would always be necessary for a
person experienced in interpreting fMRI scans to present fMRI evidence
in a trial because "no fMRI image speaks for itself." 85 That is,
laypersons cannot look at a brain scan image and determine whether a
CVS witness was answering "yes" or "no"; instead, someone with
education and experience in this field must do the interpreting. There
are at least two ways that the legal system could treat the person
explaining the brain scans: either as an expert witness or an
interpreter. How this role is defined will affect how a court assesses the
admissibility of the person's testimony.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have one rule specifically
regarding interpreters-Rule 604-which states: "An interpreter must

83.
84.
85.
BEHAV.

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 368 (2008); Davis, 547 U.S. at 832-33.
United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 367).
N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the Insanity Defense, 29
SCI. & L. 592, 593 (2011).
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be qualified and must give an oath or affirmation to make a true
translation." Thus, a person who could demonstrate an educational or
occupational background in neuroscience and reading brain scans, and
who also gave an oath of affirmation in court, could act as an
interpreter. Most of the conversation around neuroimages in the
courtroom centers around diagnostic inferences made by examining
brain scans, which require an "inferential leap" of using an image of the
brain to explain behavior (e.g., when a researcher claims a defendant
demonstrates a potential for future violent behavior because there is no
activity in a certain part of the defendant's brain when shown a violent
image).8 6 But, when using brain scans to say something akin to "this
brain scan indicates that at this moment the patient was imagining
playing tennis," no inferential leap is made.
Thus, the use of this technology for communicating with CVS
patients is most analogous to language itself in that CVS patients
"speak" a language that is foreign to others in a courtroom. Just as
courtroom interpreters translate for individuals who speak foreign
languages, researchers or doctors "translate" the "foreign language" of
neural imagery to the judge or jury. Although other uses of
neuroimaging evidence in the courtroom lead to a diagnostic inference
(and, thus, an inferential leap), using the evidence in this context would
not. Arguably then this is not scientific evidence at all; it is "normal"
evidence that is simply enabled by a specific technology. Where science
typically illuminates facts (e.g., chemical X caused the plaintiffs
cancer), that is not what the technology is doing here-indeed, it is more
like a voice synthesizer for the CVS patient.
Therefore, this Note posits that the most logical course would be
to treat the person explaining the brain scans as an interpreter who is
just "translating" the "language" of the brain. However, judges are
probably more likely to treat the person as an expert witness given that
judges have treated individuals testifying about brain scans as experts
in other contexts.8 7 This means that whoever testifies regarding brain
86. See Jennifer Kulynych, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior: Neuroimages as Scientific
Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 240 (1996) ("Although neuroimages contain information only
about the physical or functional state of brain tissue, expert witnesses make inferential leaps by
using brain images to explain criminal behavior, lack of judgment or insight, or the potential for
future violence.").
87. See e.g., Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995) (district court did
not'abuse its discretion in admitting a physician's expert testimony about brain scans in a case
about employer's liability for employee's injury); In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales
Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2436, 2016 WL 4056026, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2016)
(denying plaintiffs motion to exclude a doctor's expert testimony about brain scans in multidistrict
litigation regarding claims of medication causing liver damage); Blotcher v. Stewart, 45 F. Supp.
3d 1274, 1283 (D. Colo. 2014) (holding that a doctor could give expert testimony regarding brain
scans in an automobile accident case); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321, 340-41, 343-44 (Utah 2007)
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scans would likely be attempting to serve as an "expert," and thus would
have to pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which covers
testimony by expert witnesses.8 8 The question then becomes whether
the technology itself is admissible-which is answered by evaluating
whether judges will treat the technology as scientific evidence. Because
the research with CVS patients is still in its early stages, judges will
likely be hesitant to permit the use of the technology without running
it through a scientific evidence admissibility analysis first. Further, the
nature of neuroimaging and brain scans seems to fall readily into the
scientific evidence category-indeed, it is evidence that involves
science. Therefore, judges are likely to treat CVS patients' brain scans
as scientific evidence, making it important to evaluate how the
technology will fare under that analysis.
E. Scientific Evidence
For a long time, the general acceptance standard was the
majority rule for admitting scientific evidence. 89 As articulated in Frye
v. United States, under this standard, an expert opinion based on a
technique is admissible only if the technique is generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community.9 0 Frye involved an attempt to admit
the results of a deception test, similar to a polygraph. 91 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the deception test did not meet
the "general acceptance" standard, since it had not gained much
recognition in the scientific community.92 The Supreme Court
eventually adopted a new standard for assessing the admissibility of
scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.93
There, the Court held that trial judges should be the ones to make
determinations regarding the admission of scientific evidence based on
whether the evidence is both "reliable" and "relevant to the task at
hand"-if it is, then the evidence is admissible. 94

(holding that defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain expert testimony regarding
victim's brain scans).
88. FED. R. EVID. 702.
89. Cassin, supra note 15, at 948.
90. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 509 U.S. 579, 587-89, 597 (1993); see Cassin, supra note 15, at 948. Note that some states
continue to use the Frye standard, although the majority follow Daubert. For a state-by-state
breakdown on this issue, see Michael Morgenstern, Daubert v. Frye - A State-by-State
Comparison, EXPERT INST. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/daubert-v-frye-astate-by-state-comparison/ [https://perma.ce/4RCN-6MNN].
94. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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To assist judges in making these determinations, the Daubert
Court announced several factors judges can use to determine reliability:
(1) "whether the technique has been tested," (2) "whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication," (3) "the potential error rate
in using the technique," (4) "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling its operation," and (5) "whether it has been
generally accepted in the scientific community." 95 While these factors
are persuasive, the Court was careful to note that the overall
assessment is a flexible one and the factors are not a "definitive
checklist or test." 96 In this way, the Court provided judges with a
decisionmaking framework, but allowed judges the necessary flexibility
to adapt their decisions to factually different situations. 97 In other
words, the Daubert factors are simply meant to assist judges in making
a decision-meeting all of the factors does not necessarily mean the
evidence will get admitted, just as not meeting all of the factors does
not automatically keep the evidence out. 98 Thus, fMRI scanning on CVS
patients would not necessarily have to meet all of the Daubert factors
in order to be admissible, although judges are likely to assess each
individual factor when making the admissibility determination.
The Daubert Court also addressed concerns that abandoning the
Frye "general acceptance" standard would result in the admission of
pseudoscientific evidence that would confuse juries, specifically stating
that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 99
Essentially, this means that a judge need only determine that the
scientific evidence is relevant for it to be admissible, because after that
the judicial "process," (e.g., cross-examination of the expert witness, the
presentation of contrary evidence, and instructions on the burden of
proof) is all that is necessary to address concerns about the evidence.10 0
Thus, the relevancy standard entails a "liberal perspective" in terms of
95. 509 U.S. at 593-94; Cassin, supra note 15, at 948. After Daubert, Rule 702 was amended
in order to reflect the Court's decision. Cassin, supra note 15, at 948.
96. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence After
Daubert, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 105, 109 (2005) ("Daubert finally places the obligation to
evaluate the evidence where one might have expected it to be all along: on the judges themselves.").
97. See Teitcher, supra note 47, at 370.
98. See id.
99. 509 U.S. at 596; Teitcher, supra note 47, at 370-71.
100. See Green, supra note 58, at 31-32; see also Mark Pettit, Jr., fMRI and BF Meet FRE:
Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 325 (2007). The
Supreme Court supported its assertion in Daubertthat the test proposed there was more liberal
and flexible than that in Frye by claiming in another case that "the Daubert standard admits a
broader range of testimony than the general acceptance test." Cassin, supranote 15, at 949 (citing
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997)).
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application.101 Indeed, it seems that if a testifying expert for
neuroimaging technology can proffer "sufficient supporting data and
explain how the hypotheses were tested while accounting for conflicting
opinions in true scientific fashion," then this overcomes the Daubert
hurdle and can be admitted. 102
Importantly though, the concern presented by the scenario at
the beginning of Part II is not just a debate about whether fMRI is an
accepted technology, but whether fMRI can be accepted in court for this
specific use. If the proffered use (in our case, allowing a CVS witness to
testify) is far enough removed from the typical use of the technology,
then the court may be persuaded to exclude the evidence. For instance,
in United States v. Semrau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit considered the use of fMRI as a lie detector to be far enough
removed from the typical use of fMRI (e.g., medical use for patients) to
exclude the proffered evidence. 10 3 The use of fMRI to communicate with
CVS patients, though, is more closely related to the typical use of fMRI,
since it can involve medical assistance for patients (e.g., by asking
patients questions about their healthcare experiences and preferences).
Furthermore, using fMRI with CVS patients only necessitates objective
evaluations of whether a patient answered "yes" or "no" (as opposed to
lie detection via fMRI, which requires a more subjective evaluation10 4).
One reason courts are so concerned with "typical uses" involves
the idea that if something is used for its typical purpose it better
protects against reliability concerns. When it comes to neuroscience
technology, legal actors are especially concerned about reliability due to
a fear that juries may be abnormally swayed by this type of evidence. 10
The concern is that pictures of brain scans and the testimony about
them may "provide an air of infallibility and strongly prejudice or
mislead a jury." 106 Some scholars have called this problem the

101. Green, supra note 58, at 32.
102. Teitcher, supra note 47, at 392 (citing Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia Rill, The
Law and the Brain:Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243,256, 262,
275-76 (1999)).
103. 693 F.3d 510, 521-23 (6th Cir. 2012).
104. See Zachary E. Shapiro, Truth, Deceit, and Neuroimaging: Can Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Serve as a Technology-Based Method of Lie Detection?, 29 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
527, 533 (2016) ("Crucially, there was no single region of the brain that was always active when
different subjects lied, indicating the variability and unknowns that remain.").
105. J. Ken Thompson, A Review of the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 17 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 741, 742-43 (1994).
106. Teitcher, supra note 47, at 372-73.
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"seductive allure" of neuroscience. 107 However, there is conflicting
evidence on whether neuroscience in fact has such a power over people.
For instance, one study indicated that participants who saw a
brain scan image were more likely to grant a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity.1 0 8 In this experiment, participants read a summary
of a criminal trial where the defendant put forth an insanity defense. 109
Participants were divided into six groups, each receiving a different
version of the evidence presented at trial. 110 One group received a brain
scan image, one received a clinical psychologist's testimony, and one
received no expert evidence (acting as the control group).'1 1 After
reading the evidence, participants determined a verdict. Those who saw
the brain scan image were more likely to grant a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity than those participants in the control group. 11 2
However, there was very little difference in verdict results between the
brain scan image group and the group that received testimony by a
clinical psychologist. 1 1 3 Therefore, "[t]his suggests that neuroscience
would not be significantly more prejudicial than psychologist testimony,
which is already routinely permitted in trials." 114 Since this study
indicates the potential that some of the jury's overreliance on
neuroscience evidence stems from viewing the actual image of the brain
(rather than just hearing or reading testimony from an expert, like a
clinical psychologist), a judge might consider admitting the expert
testimony of a neuroscientist to discuss the brain scans but not
permitting the party to introduce any actual brain scan images into
evidence.1 15

Thus, it appears that under the current legal framework
neuroimaging evidence-even when used for purposes besides
diagnostic inferences-faces hurdles before it can enter the courtroom.
Interestingly, many of these hurdles seem to be based on the way people
view neuroimaging technology, rather than on the black letter law. As
discussed above, there is good reason not to treat the use of this
technology as scientific evidence when it is used to communicate with
107. See Cassin, supra note 15, at 951 ("Many believe jurors will be prone to give
neuroscientific evidence a disproportionate amount of weight.").
108. Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 85, at 596-98.
109. Id. at 597.
110. Id. at 598-99.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 602.
113. Id.
114. Cassin, supra note 15, at 951-52 (citing United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133-34 (1st
Cir. 1995), which determined that the lower court's exclusion of expert psychological testimony
was in error; and State v. Buechler, 572 N.W.2d 65, 74 (Neb. 1998), which found the same).
115. See Cassin, supra note 15, at 952.
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CVS patients, but likely courts will indeed treat it as such simply
because of the fact that an fMRI and brain scans are involved.
Additionally, the fear surrounding the "seductive allure" of
neuroscience, even if unwarranted, may make judges hesitant to permit
this technology in their courtrooms.
Therefore, a party looking to admit fMRI scans into evidence for
the purposes discussed in this Note must consider and overcome all of
the obstacles. The party would do best to find a well-qualified person to
testify regarding the brain scans, such as one who has been interpreting
brain scans for a long time or has a high accuracy rate in interpreting
verifiable brain scans, like those involving healthy volunteers. The
party also ought to make persuasive arguments about the necessity of
this evidence in the case at hand and offer to take steps to protect
against the risk of the jury being too strongly persuaded by the scientific
nature of the evidence (perhaps by agreeing not to admit the actual
brain scan images). Taking this approach gives the party the best
opportunity of having the evidence admitted under the current legal
framework. However, if the evidence ultimately cannot make it past a
judge or convince a jury, the following Parts demonstrates that there
are still areas of the legal system where we might be able to employ this
neuroscience technology.
III. NEURON-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIVE
USES

Imagine you are a police officer trying to solve a murder. There
was one witness to the crime, but before questioning she was involved
in a car accident that left her in a vegetative state. However, a brain
scan shows evidence that she retains consciousness. Is there a way for
you to ask her questions to help you identify the murderer? Could
information gleaned from her be the basis for probable cause in
obtaining an arrest warrant? More broadly, is it possible to use this
technology in a criminal investigation, rather than a trial? Here, the
CVS witness's "statements" would not be proof, but rather would act as
an investigative tool-the threshold for which is lower under the
existing legal framework-making this technology more likely to be
accepted for use in investigations than as evidence in criminal trials.
A. Investigative Tactics
Witness competency and accuracy, discussed in Part II, remain
important considerations in this context. After all, in most situations
involving the questioning of witnesses, police can assess various factors

NEURONAL TESTIMONIAL

2018]

1389

to determine witness credibility. For instance, police might evaluate
how nervous a witness seems, how much detail she is able to provide,
and how emotional (or unemotional) she is when providing answers.
Much of this would be difficult or impossible to evaluate with a CVS
witness-since she cannot move or speak, or even explain her yes-or-no
answers, all the police are left with is the simple response of yes or no.
There are a few possible ways to combat this concern. For one,
police could start by asking the CVS witness questions with verifiable
answers, such as questions about personal history or basic common
knowledge. The police could also ask the CVS witness questions about
the crime that the officers already know the answer to in order to test
for accuracy. 116 For example:
Police Know Correct Answer Is

"Yes"

Police Know Correct Answer Is

"No"9

Did the crime occur on January 21st,
2018?
Was the weapon used during the

Did the crime occur on January1st,
2018?
Was the weapon used during the

commission of the crime a gun?

commission of the crime a knife?

Recall that the questions have to be phrased in a yes-or-no (or at
least a binary) way. For instance, examiners could instruct the CVS
witness to think about playing tennis if the weapon used was a gun or
think about walking through a house if the weapon used was a knife,
rather than asking a series of these two questions in yes-or-no format.
By asking verifiable questions, the police would be able to get some
sense as to whether the CVS witness was providing any factually
correct information.
In addition to using fMRI technology to ask the CVS witness
binary questions about the crime, it would also be possible to carry out
a sequential photo lineup where the witness views photographs of the
potential suspect(s) and "filler" photos (such as stock photographs) that
may resemble the suspect(s)-assuming the CVS witness has retained
visual capabilities (i.e., the traumatic event did not leave her blind). On
the other hand, a simultaneous photo lineup (where all of the photos
are shown at once) might be more difficult to carry out in the scenario
presented at the beginning of Part III. With the sequential method, the

116. It is important to note here that we cannot ascribe a certain "motive" or reason to a CVS
patient if they answer a verifiable question incorrectly, since the only thing we know is whether
they thought about playing tennis or walking through a house. It may be that the patient did not
properly hear the question, could not comprehend the question, mistakenly thought about the
incorrect mental imagery, or attempted to intentionally deceive the questioner. Cf. supra note 82
(questioning whether it is fair to rely on a witness who may have an easy out for questions she
does not want to answer).
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witness can answer yes or no to each photograph, as the images are
shown one at a time; with the simultaneous method, the photos would
be shown all at once. Thus, for the simultaneous method a researcher
would have to give an instruction such as, "Think about playing tennis
when I have indicated the photo you believe to be the perpetrator. Is
the perpetrator pictured in the top left? Is the perpetrator pictured in
the top center? Is the perpetrator pictured in the top right?" (and so on).
Although a simultaneous lineup might be a bit more difficult to carry
out, it is still theoretically possible, and police could use either method
when questioning a CVS witness.1 1 7
While these techniques could be useful to police in
investigations, the real question is whether the possible investigative
uses of the brain-computer interface technology can serve as the basis
for probable cause. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
requires probable cause before a court can issue a warrant for police to
make an arrest or carry out a search. 118 Notably, hearsay can be used
to form the basis of probable cause, meaning police officers can rely on
any witness statements available to them during an investigation. 119
Essentially, the legal question then is whether police officers can use a
technology that is still in its early, and perhaps speculative, stages to
generate probable cause. To analyze this question, it is helpful to
examine somewhat analogous pieces of evidence that are able to serve
as the basis for probable cause.
B. Analogous Technology
Analogous technology in this context includes some kind of
mechanism or evidence that defies cross-examination. Of course, the
CVS witness could theoretically be cross-examined, and the person
testifying about the meaning of the brain scans could certainly be crossexamined, but this Section will focus on analogous technologies, not the
people involved with the technology. Take police use of drug-sniffing
117. For more information on the differences between sequential and simultaneous photo
lineups, and a discussion of the pros and cons of each method, see Nate Kornell, Should Police
Lineups Be
Sequential or Simultaneous?, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (June 25,
2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.comblog/everybody-is-stupid-except-you/201406/should-policelineups-be-sequential-or-simultaneous [https://perma.cc/8KVH-756C].
118. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Probable Cause, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edulwex/probable-cause (last visited May 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
MF98-KA4D]. Note though that if there are "exigent circumstances" then a warrantless search or
seizure may be justified. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148-50 (2013) (discussing what may
qualify as an exigent circumstance and the test for whether an officer faced a situation that
justified a warrantless search or seizure).
119. In trials, by contrast, prosecutors have to point to solid evidence, rather than rely on
hearsay (unless, of course, a hearsay exception is applicable). See supra Section II.B.
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dogs, for instance. Plainly, it is impossible to ask the dog questions
about why she did or did not alert (i.e., react) to the odor or presence of
drugs in a certain situation. Yet, police routinely use drug-sniffing dog
alerts as the basis for probable cause. Indeed, in 2013 the Supreme
Court held that drug-sniffing dogs' alerts to the odor of drugs can form
the basis of probable cause. 120 The Court noted that training records
established the dog's reliability and that probable cause is a "flexible,
common-sense standard." 121 Arguably, the neuroscience technology laid
out in the scenario in Part III may be analyzed in the same way-as
long as there is some sort of record establishing the reliability of the
testing mechanism, or perhaps a record establishing the reliability of
this specific CVS witness's answers, the investigative method can serve
as the basis of probable cause.
Another analogous piece of evidence involves the use of
machines to form the basis of probable cause. For example, courtroom
actors clearly cannot cross-examine a radar gun, but radar guns can
undergo reliability testing. 122 As one scholar notes about a U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opinion, "[i]n the court's view, machine
assertions-although raising reliability concerns-are simply the
products of mechanical processes and, therefore, akin to physical
evidence." 123 Of course, the "machine assertion" in the hypothetical
scenario presented at the beginning of Part III is not simply the
machine, it involves human input at multiple levels, including the
person in the scanner, the researcher interpreting the brain scans that
the machine puts out, and the developer of the machine itself. Certainly
though, some of this is true of all machines in the sense that they are
all created by humans. Despite this possible setback in reliability,
courts have often relied on "machine testimony" in various forms and
thus ought to be open to doing so in the case of neuroscience technology
as a communication device for CVS witnesses. 124
Even if courts consider this technology to be insufficient as a
basis for probable cause, its potential uses may still be effective in
helping police identify suspects and learn more about crimes they are
investigating. If this is the case, one can think about this technology as
a license to interrogate, rather than as a basis for probable cause. For

120. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013).
121. Id. at 240 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)).
122. Accuracy of Radar Guns to Play Out in Court, NASHVILLE PUB. RADIO (Nov. 1, 2007, 6:00
[https://perma.ccV534AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=15835078
7TSY].
123. Andrea L. Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1975 (2017) (citing United
States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015)).
124. See id. at 1975-76.
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example, instead of arresting a person that a CVS witness indicates
committed the crime, police could simply interrogate the identified
person, which does not require probable cause. 125 Interrogation of that
person may then lead to more evidence, such as a confession, which
could then provide the basis for probable cause to make an arrest. Thus,
even if this technology cannot be used as the sole basis for probable
cause, it still has applicable uses within criminal investigations.
Undoubtedly though, the cases where a witness is a CVS patient
likely are not high in number. Of course, just because it may not affect
a great number of people or cases does not mean that it lessens the
importance for those it does affect. 126 But where might society most
commonly see a need for this technology in the legal system? The
answer is when court proceedings are required for a CVS patient's endof-life care issues or healthcare decisionmaking. The subsequent Part
explores brain-computer interface technology within that legal context.
IV. NEURONAL WISHES AND POSSIBLE HEALTHCARE DECISIONS IN
COURT

Imagine that you have ended up in a vegetative state but have
retained consciousness. You do not have a legal document explaining
your wishes in this situation. Some members of your family believe you
would want life-sustaining measures, other family members believe you
would want to cease such treatment. Is there a way for your loved ones
to know your current wishes? Regardless of anything you said (or did
not say) before you ended up in this condition, can you share your intent
on whether you want to continue life-sustaining treatment with family
members and, if necessary, a court?
Under this scenario, neuroscience technology could be useful in
court when end-of-life issues or other healthcare decisions are disputed
among family members and caregivers. 1 27 In fact, this is the actual
scenario that the technology is being developed for-to give CVS
patients a voice in their own decisionmaking. 1 2 8 Neuroimaging thus has
a role to play in end-of-life intent, "and it seems likely that such tests
will soon be offered as evidence in court proceedings." 129

125. Such interrogation is of course subject to proper criminal investigation procedures, such
as Miranda warnings.
126. The need for the technology and the significance in understanding its potential uses in
criminal trials and investigations is still substantial for those CVS witnesses who can use it.
127. Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 23, at 377.
128. See Ledford, supra note 24.
129. Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 23, at 377.
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Here, the Confrontation Clause would not be a problem since
court proceedings regarding healthcare decisions take place in the civil,
not criminal, context. Additionally, hearsay may be less of an issue
because the Residual Exception becomes extraordinarily valid here-if
the patient is indeed conscious, this is the only way for her to
communicate her current wishes. Thus, admissibility becomes a
balancing question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which says a
court must exclude evidence if its "probative value is substantially
outweighed" by its potential for prejudice, confusion, and the like.13 0
Since the probative value here is extremely high (i.e., understanding
the patient's intent, at the most extreme level being whether they want
to live or die) and the unfair prejudice appears nonexistent (i.e., this is
not a criminal trial where a person's liberty is on the line), the evidence
ought to be admissible. The relevancy of patient intent is further
explored in the following Section.
A. Patient Intent
Part of the consideration for the scenario presented in Part IV is
a desire to respect patient autonomy, including the right to refuse
medical care and the right to privacy.131 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
established refusal of care as a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, though
the Court noted that this should be balanced against the state's interest
in preserving life. 132 However, the Court in Cruzan seemed concerned
about the state's interest being given too little weight when the refusal
of care decision was being made for an incompetent person by someone
else, stating:
The differences between the choice made by a competent person to refuse medical
treatment, and the choice made for an incompetent person by someone else to refuse
medical treatment, are so obviously different that the State is warranted in establishing
rigorous procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply to the former class. 133

130. FED. R. EVID. 403.
131. See Darren P. Mareiniss, A Comparison of Cruzan and Schiavo: The Burden of Proof, Due
Process, and Autonomy in the Persistently Vegetative Patient, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 233, 233 (2005)
(exploring how autonomy, as reflected in the right to refuse care and the right to privacy, has
become an overriding issue for courts); see also Peterson et al., supra note 17, at 4 ("Preservation
of patient autonomy is a hallmark of ethical medical care ....
132. 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
133. Id. at 287 n.12; see also Kathy L. Cerminara, Law, Perception, and Cultural Cognition
Near the End of Life, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 597, 616 (2016):
The ability to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of another human
being is an awesome power. Because of the importance of being able to make a decision
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If neuroscience technology can establish that a vegetative-state
patient is conscious and competent, then this changes the equation-no
longer must someone else be making healthcare decisions on the
patient's behalf, but rather the patient could make such decisions on
her own. Indeed, if a patient is able to make decisions herself, then her
liberty interest ought to outweigh the state interest in preserving life
(if the patient's wishes conflict with that state interest). This affects the
legal analysis because, as noted above, the stringency of the procedure
for refusing medical care depends on who is making the healthcare
decision (the person herself or someone else on her behalf).
Further, encompassed within federal and state constitutional
rights to privacy is the right to control one's medical course, including
the right to be free of unwanted treatment.134 Additionally, case law
indicates "that the right to refuse treatment is not lost merely because
the noncognitive and vegetative condition of the patient prevents a
conscious exercise of the choice to refuse further extraordinary
treatment." 135 Thus, this protection for unconscious patients in a
vegetative state indicates that the right to refuse "further extraordinary
treatment" logically must also extend to conscious patients in a
vegetative state.
Despite the developments in neuroscience, these rights may still
be left unprotected since some jurisdictions have laws which, due to
their narrow wording, do not currently permit fMRI communication as
a method by which a patient can legally change her advance
directive.136 For instance, Colorado's statutory law permits revocation
of a declaration only if the revocation is done orally, in writing, or by

that will end someone else's life, the state has more ability to regulate that
decisionmaking process than it has to regulate a patient's own decisionmaking for
himself or herself.
Of course, if a patient has an advance directive or other legal document permitting someone else
to make healthcare decisions on her behalf, then procedures for permitting the designated person
to make such decisions may not need to be too rigorous.
134. See, e.g., Gray ex rel. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that
an individual has a right "to control fundamental medical decisions" regarding his or her own
body); Conservatorship of Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that
state law "gives persons a right to determine the scope of their own medical treatment" and that
"this right survives incompetence in the sense that incompetent patients retain the right to have
appropriate decisions made on their behalf); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d
596, 600-02 (Conn. 1984) (discussing prior case law and the historical importance of the right to
refuse medical treatment); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983) (explaining the
importance of the right to privacy and the right to be free from bodily invasion); Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 443 (citing these and other similar cases).
135. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 443 (citations omitted) (quoting another source) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
136. See Harman, supra note 41, at 201 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (2010); MD.
CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-106 (2010)).
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physically destroying the declaration (e.g., burning the document). 137
Thus, a patient's communication via an fMRI scanner would not qualify
under the text of the statute, meaning that a patient could not revoke a
declaration in this way.
The text of Maryland's and Tennessee's statutory laws are
similar, and if these statutes are not amended, a CVS patient in these
jurisdictions may not be able to effect changes to her legal documentseven if she wanted to revoke a directive ordering removal of life
support. 13 8 Indeed, the advancements in neuroscience technology
"bring[ ] to light a class of people who can and should be making
important healthcare decisions, but are now hindered only by the
law." 139 Thus, the law ought to develop to meet the needs of this
population by permitting patients who can communicate via braincomputer interface technology the ability to adjust their legal
documents using this method.
B. Concerns
Notwithstanding that there should be an obligation to
communicate with these patients regarding their medical care, there
are obstacles to facilitating this communication. The first concern is
something that seems simple but is in fact considerably complicated:
defining the vegetative state. Although there are broad parameters that
outline what the vegetative state is, it can actually be very difficult for
practitioners to differentiate from the minimally conscious state ("a
condition in which a patient may inconsistently respond to commands,
but cannot communicate interactively" 1 40 ) and locked-in syndrome ("a
mental state in which a patient is awake and aware of his surroundings,
but due to total or near-total paralysis is unable to move or speak" 141).
Since every patient-and brain injury-is unique, this further
complicates the task of defining the vegetative state and makes
formulating a general medical definition extremely difficult. 142

137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109.
138. See Harman, supra note 41, at 215 (noting that because certain patients lack
communication skills, the statutes as written deny these individuals the opportunity to change
their medical directives).
139. Id. at 216.
140. Ledford, supra note 24.
141. Harman, supranote 41, at 195.
142. See Michael Hopkin, Thoughts of Woman in 'Waking Coma' Revealed, NATURE (Sept. 7,
[https://perma.cc/
2006),
http://www.nature.com/news/2006/060904/full/newsO6O9O4-11.html
4WVJ-K4NW] (debating whether a comatose patient who fulfills all the diagnostic criteria for a
vegetative state but demonstrates conscious awareness should be defined as existing in a
vegetative state).
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For the purposes of assessing patient intent in end-of-life care
and healthcare decisionmaking, which medical category the patient
falls into should not be pertinent so long as she is able to use fMRI
technology for communication purposes. However, the patient's
diagnosis is relevant to the law because most states limit the decision
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, such as artificial
nutrition, to situations where the patient is in a permanently
unconscious or vegetative state. 143 Thus, the medical definitions can
have legal ramifications that affect whether practitioners are able to
carry out patients' wishes regarding end-of-life care.
Furthermore, current statutory law also places certain
parameters on end-of-life care.144 These statutes often contain
underdeveloped definitions of the "vegetative state," which are made
further incomprehensible by the fact that these definitions often do not
conform to the medical definitions or understanding of these
diagnoses. 145 Additionally vexing is that, given divergent state-law
definitions and the need for courts to analyze these matters on a caseby-case basis, case law does not elucidate the question of how to define
or diagnose the vegetative state. 146
Another concern involves decisionmaking capacity. If a patient
appears to make a decision to end life-sustaining care, are we willing to
accept the possibility that the patient is not necessarily capable of such
consequential judgment and perhaps did not actually want to die?
Incapacity is defined as "an individual's functional inability to
understand or to form an intention with regard to some act, as
determining
provider." 147 In
a healthcare
by
determined
decisionmaking capacity, simply discovering residual cognitive function
in a vegetative-state patient by finding that she retains an ability to
answer general yes-or-no questions is not sufficient. 148 Instead, the
assessment involves whether the person has specific knowledge as it
relates to the task at hand, as well as the ability to coordinate the
information necessary to complete the task. 149 The brain injury

143. Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 23, at 375.
144. See id. at 377 ('Many states have enacted statutes to address end-of-life surrogate
decision-making, advance directives, or both.").
145. Id.
146. Id. at 377-78.
147. Simon & Abrams, supra note 62, at 535.
148. Id.; see also Hampshire et al., supranote 41, at 174 ("[I]f a physically non-communicative
patient were ever to be asked to make decisions regarding the course of their long-term
maintenance or whether potentially aversive treatments should be administered, it would first be
necessary to demonstrate that they were able to make logical inferences in response to complex
questions.").
149. Simon & Abrams, supra note 62, at 535.
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inherent in the vegetative state complicates this, as "behaviorally
nonresponsive patients with covert awareness are presumed to be
decisionally impaired."1 5 0
Because of concerns related to decisionmaking capacity, some
scholars have been hesitant to support asking patients in a vegetative
state significant decisionmaking questions, such as end-of-life
preferences, claiming that there may be underlying psychiatric
ailments (e.g., depression) besides the brain injury which could
influence patient answers. 151 The concern stems from research studies
that demonstrated a correlation between brain injury and various
psychiatric conditions. 152 The theory follows that if brain injury
diminishes mental or psychiatric health, it is reasonable to assume that
there is diminished decisionmaking capacity as well, regardless of
whether consciousness remains. 153
The counterargument is that this concern simply necessitates
the development of a way to test for psychiatric ailments, such as
depression, in this patient population in order to determine whether the
patient has diminished decisionmaking capacity.154 Validated
measures that currently test for these ailments, such as the Beck
Depression Inventory,1 55 could be adapted to ask only yes-or-no (or
binary) questions, so that researchers could assess patients who
communicate via fMRI technology using these scales before permitting
the patients to make important healthcare decisions. 15 6 There is also
literature on the quality of life experienced by patients with locked-in
syndrome, which is similar to the vegetative state.1 57 In a study
involving locked-in syndrome patients, participants self-assessed their
"global subjective well-being."1 58 Forty-seven of the sixty-five patients
reported "overall happiness." 15 9 Notably, the longer a patient had spent
in the locked-in state, the more likely she was to report greater
happiness.160 This study suggests that having a brain injury does not

150. Peterson et al., supra note 17, at 4.
151. See id. at 10-11 (discussing the ethics of asking "behaviorally nonresponsive patients
with residual covert awareness" questions with "high-stakes outcomes").
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11.
155. The Beck Depression Inventory is intended to assess the intensity of depression. See
Aaron T. Beck, Robert A. Steer & Margery G. Garbin, Psychometric Properties of the Beck
Depression Inventory: Twenty-Five Years of Evaluation, 8 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 79 (1988).
156. Peterson et al., supra note 17, at 11.
157. See id. (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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necessarily mean that a patient will also be suffering from "diminished
psychiatric well-being." 16 1
Importantly, decisionmaking is not an "all-or-nothing concept";
rather, it exists on a continuum, where the threshold for the capacity to
make decisions depends (at least to some extent) on the gravity of the
decision. 162 For example, we may not necessarily question the capacity
of someone to make a decision for themselves about whether to refuse a
flu vaccination, even if the person lacks some of the conditions deemed
necessary for coherent decisionmaking abilities. 163 However, we would
probably be hesitant to let the same person refuse life-saving and safe
treatment for a fatal disease. 164 This is because our calculus of the
importance of the decisions-and the consequences of those decisionsis markedly different.1 6 5 The first is a basic health choice with the most
likely worst-case-scenario being that the person catches the influenza
virus and is sick for a few days. The second is a life-altering choice
where the consequence of death is a certainty. This is essentially what
makes the end-of-life debate difficult-the consequences of the decision
to end life-sustaining treatment are as far as the continuum can reach.
Therefore, society may be hesitant to permit someone in a
vegetative state, who has sustained some level of brain injury, to make
such a consequential decision. This value society places on capable
decisionmaking may thus be in tension with the value of respecting
patient autonomy. Ultimately, the legal system may have to decideeither across the board or on a case-by-case basis-which value it
weighs more heavily. In situations where patients are able to
demonstrate conscious thought though, it seems counterintuitive to
entirely disregard their wishes. Thus, the legal system must address
these countervailing concerns.
First, the legal system could maintain that patients in this
condition who demonstrate conscious thought must undergo more
rigorous testing than the "typical" person when the court is determining
their level of competency. This could be similar to tests used with TBI
patients or those with mental disabilities, though such tests would of
course need to be adapted for use with fMRI technology (e.g., phrasing
answers to test questions in a binary way). Second, the legal system
could formulate a "partial competency" framework, whereby a patient's
161. Id. ("Surely, there will be cases of psychiatric illness secondary to severe brain injury,
which will undermine decision-making capacity. However, the foregoing study suggests that in the
case of patient groups with severe neurological insult, the prevalence of depression may be small.").
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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wishes are considered, but perhaps consent from a legal guardian would
also be required if the patient is asking to end life-sustaining treatment.
If the patient's wishes conflict with those of the legal guardian, a court
could step in and make factual determinations based on evidence such
as the patient's previous statements about healthcare treatment
preferences, the current condition the patient is in, and so forth.
Regardless of how the legal system chooses to address this question, it
is imperative that it be addressed, since patients' autonomy-and their
lives-hang in the balance.
CONCLUSION

How we can use technology that allows us to communicate with
CVS patients within our legal system is not a simple question. It
depends on the particular patient, the type of court proceeding, the
nature of the questions asked and answers given, the purpose for which
the communication is offered, and the conclusions asserted. 166 Although
there are overlapping concerns with the attempted use of this
technology in different facets of the legal system, each area of the law
has unique considerations.16 7 Notably though, as both the technology
and the law develop, the calculus of admissibility will change. As it
currently stands, the evidence garnered from this neuroscience
technology is unlikely to be admissible for the purpose of CVS witness
testimony in criminal trials. On the other hand, the use of this
technology in police investigations and for making legal decisions
regarding healthcare has broader applicability and fits more
comfortably within the current framework.
Despite the present difficulties in implementing neuroimaging
technology within the legal system, the imminent advances in
neuroscience are likely to assuage some of the hesitations the law has
about the technology. Indeed, the logical advancement in neuroscience
involves using this technology to allow patients to communicate beyond
yes-or-no answers.1 68 For example, a researcher could say "imagine
playing tennis when I say the letter you want," thus permitting a
patient to create entire sentences in this way-although it would be
166. See Cassin, supra note 15, at 950-51 (noting that admissibility of neuroscience evidence
necessarily will involve a case-by-case analysis).
167. For instance, it is important to consider that this technology can only be used in a binary,
yes-or-no format (for now) and these types of questions can be leading. While asking leading
questions during a cross-examination may be fine-since cross-examinations generally are
leading-we may want to avoid leading questions in direct examinations, in questioning a witness
during an investigation, and in asking about healthcare preferences.
168. See Taylor, supra note 11, at 1473 (positing a potential nonbinary method that CVS
patients could use to communicate).
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time consuming.1 6 9 Even with that drawback, this type of method has
been used with a locked-in syndrome patient who was able to
communicate via eye-blink movements.1 70 In that instance, the patient
would blink when the letter he wanted was read off by a researcher or
family member, eventually forming full sentences-in fact, he even
authored an entire book using this method. 171
The future of this area-both the science and the law-is
unknown, but "[e]very useful new development must have its first day
in court."1 72 The technology will improve, and each of these scenarios
will have its courtroom debut-perhaps sooner rather than later. When
that day comes, the legal system should be prepared with where to
begin its analysis. This Note offers a starting point from which to
commence.
Jessica Lauren Haushalter*

169. See id. (discussing the possible drawbacks of letter-by-letter communication).
170. See JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY, THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY: A MEMOIR OF LIFE

IN DEATH (Jeremy Leggatt trans., First Vintage International ed. 1998) (detailing the author's
experience with locked-in syndrome, which reduced his ability to communicate to blinking his left
eye).
171. See id. (poignantly, when Bauby first learned to communicate using this method, he was
asked what he wanted and the first thing he spelled out with his eye blinks was "death").
172. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970).
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